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Abstract 
Donor agencies have actively supported microenterprise programs during the past 
decade. Several evaluations have been conducted and identified their successes and failures. 
A particularly good evaluation was done by the U.S. Agency for International Development. 
This paper summarizes the highlights of this evaluation, identifies the characteristics of 
successful projects and discusses eight policy issues concerning microenterprise development. 
-- ----------.. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Considerable attention has been focused on rural nonfarm enterprises in recent years by 
donor agencies and development specialists. Micro and small scale enterprises have also been the 
subject of many recent studies. Undoubtedly, some of this interest is due to the growing realiza-
tion that large scale, modem industrialization strategies of previous decades have failed to solve 
many problems of underemployment and poverty (Liedholm and Mead). In recent years, it has 
become popular to view support for microenterprises as being an effective way to stimulate the 
private sector's contribution to growth and equity objectives of developing countries. 
Nongovernmental (NGOs) and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) have become particularly 
active in support programs of credit, training and technical assistance for urban and rural small 
scale enterprises. Donor agencies have begun to channel a larger share of their financial support 
to NGOs and PVOs rather than through government agencies. 
There is considerable debate about the appropriate way to provide support to 
microenterprises. Many programs advocate low interest rates and other subsidies to help start or 
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expand businesses. Critics claim that such an approach may be doomed to the same failures as 
experienced by small farmer credit programs in the 1970s and 1980s (Adams and Von Pishke). 
Several donor agencies have conducted evaluations of their experiences in supporting micro 
and small enterprises. These evaluations can be found in reports prepared by APRODI; Ashe and 
Cosslett; Boomgard; Carter, lnnamorati and McCarthy; Dessing; European Investment Bank; 
International Labor Office; Jackelen; Webster (1990); and Webster (1991).1 A common theme 
discussed in these evaluations concerns program sustainability because donors have been criticized 
for supporting many programs that cannot continue to operate after donor support ends. 
One of the most active donors in microenterprise programs during the last decade has been 
the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID). In 1988 and 1989, AID undertook and 
published a major stocktaking of its experiences in microenterprise development (Boomgard). 
Although the data used are somewhat weak, generally this evaluation is more thorough and 
insightful than the others. Therefore, its findings are useful in raising issues about 
microenterprises in developing countries. 
The purpose of this paper is to briefly summarize the AID evaluation, and utilize its 
findings to raise policy issues about microenterprise development. It is hoped that these general 
issues will be relevant for the situation that Chile faces as it tries to stimulate the development of 
micro and small enterprises. The next section of the paper will present the AID evaluation and 
the third section will discuss policy issues. 
1 A summary of these evaluations can be found in Meyer (1991b). 
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THE EXPERIENCE OF AID 
The stocktaking evaluation represented a major effort by AID to evaluate what was learned 
about what works and what doesn't work in its microenterprise projects (Boomgard). It focused 
on identifying projects and programs with proven effectiveness in generating and sustaining 
developmental benefits, and in analyzing the factors responsible for their success. Throughout the 
study, microenterprises were defined as firms that employ 10 or fewer full-time workers. 
By the mid 1980s, AID was involved in at least 87 active microenterprise projects or 
programs in 35 countries. A purposive sample of 32 projects and programs located in 20 countries 
was selected for detailed study in the stocktaking. They were selected because they targeted 
assistance to microenterprises, and some analysis of beneficiary impact was available. In almost 
all cases, the project or program either began its operations in the 1980s or AID's involvement 
with it began at that time. Data were obtained from existing evaluations and site visits to 10 
countries. Seven programs were selected from Asia, including the large scale Indonesian BKK 
program, 11 from Africa, and 23 from Latin America. They are being implemented by PVOs, 
government agencies and credit unions. Some programs provide only credit to their beneficiaries, 
while others also provide training and technical assistance. 
Three distinct approaches to enterprise development were identified in the study. The 
enterprise formation approach attempts to help highly disadvantaged groups or individuals from 
the survival economy develop viable businesses. Programs following this approach often serve 
a relatively large proportion of new entrepreneurs and offer a comprehensive range of services 
focused on the creation of rudimentary business skills, resulting mostly in income generation 
rather than in new employment. 
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The enterprise expansion approach tries to improve the performance of existing 
microenterprises. It is essentially minimalist because it emphasizes small improvements for many 
firms, often providing only credit. The graduation of firms into small enterprises is largely left 
to natural selection, rather than project effort. 
The enterprise transformation approach actively tries to graduate entrepreneurs from 
micro to small enterprises, often by providing an integrated mix of credit, training, and technical 
assistance. The firms assisted are typically somewhat larger than those involved in the other two 
approaches so employment generation plays a relatively larger role. Both the formation and 
transformation approaches are transformation-oriented, and place heavy emphasis on technical 
assistance and training. The expansion approach, on the other hand, tries to support existing 
enterprises, and this accounts for the minimalist credit orientation. 
Six of the sampled projects and programs were found to emphasize enterprise formation, 
22 enterprise expansion, and 14 enterprise transformation. Because of multiple subprojects, the 
total number exceeds the total sample size. A relatively small number of programs in Latin 
America emphasize enterprise formation, while a relatively large proportion in Asia and the Near 
East fall in the expansion category. The sampled programs were evaluated on three criteria: 
beneficiary impact, cost-effectiveness, and institutional sustainability. 
The principal results of the AID evaluation are summarized in Table 1. The enterprise 
expansion data are presented in columns three, four and five. Column three gives the results for 
these programs treated together. Since this group is heterogeneous, the results for the six 
programs which operated primarily as financial institutions are presented separately in column 
four, and the results for the remaining programs are summarized in column five. In several cases 
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data are missing, and in other cases there was wide variance among the programs within a 
particular group. Therefore, some of the differences in mean values appear large but are not 
statistically significant, as noted in column seven. 
Most microenterprise programs serve only a few hundred clients; the exceptions are the 
financial institutions that serve thousands. Women represent a significant share of total 
beneficiaries in all programs. The formation and transformation programs tend to serve a larger 
percentage of manufacturing firms compared to other types, but the differences are not significant. 
Average program costs also are higher, but not significant, for these programs as would be 
expected with the larger amount of training and technical assistance provided their clients. 
The average loan size in transformation programs exceeded US$ 3,000 compared to 
approximately US$ 500-700 in the other programs. This finding suggests that attempts to graduate 
microenterprises to small scale firms requires a large enough change in the firm to justify a 
relatively large loan. The relative loan size can be seen by comparing average loan size relative 
to GDP per capita. The transformation programs provide loans that average ten times the average 
GDP per capita, while other programs provide loans roughly one to two times GDP per capita. 
Most programs provide 25 to 45 percent of their loans to finance fixed assets. The 
financial institutions in the expansion programs, however, provide mostly working capital which 
is consistent with their objective of helping clients make marginal improvements in their 
businesses. By lending mostly working capital, these institutions also face less stringent staff 
requirements, so it is easier to operate large scale institutions reaching thousands of clients. 
The data in the bottom three lines of Table 1 give some indication of the comparative cost-
effectiveness and financial sustainability of the programs. Because of the modest services provided 
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and their large 'scale operations, the average program cost is lowest for the expansion programs 
with an average of just under $0. 50 per dollar lent. Transformation programs on average cost 
double that amount, while formation programs cost six times more. One good indication of a 
program's ability to recover costs is reflected in the interest rate charged on loans. The expansion 
programs charge real interest rates that average up to 25 percent, while the other programs have 
a large subsidy element because they only charge 0 to 3 percent. Even the relatively high rates 
in the expansion programs do not cover program costs however. 
The challenge to recover costs is further complicated by loan delinquency and default. The 
programs report loan arrearages ranging from 16 to 24 percent on average. If only half of these 
arrearages actually result in losses, loan losses of 8 to 12 percent are still too high for most 
programs to sustain without continuous infusions of outside funds. The expansion programs come 
closest to meeting self-sufficiency, but generally the other programs are far it. Financial self-
sustainability is closest to being achieved in the best managed programs which limit their 
assistance to low cost financial services, such as the BKK and KUPEDES programs in Indonesia. 
Importantly, it was observed that credit programs that strive to become self-sustaining, even when 
the goal is unattainable, generally perform better than those that expect continuing external 
support. Organizations that think of themselves as businesses that must survive on the basis of 
earnings behave differently than if they are not subjected to this market test. 
The evaluation concludes that direct assistance programs that aim to improve the 
performance of microenterprises without attempting to transform them into more complex 
businesses have a better record of achievement than do more ambitious transformational programs. 
They typically provide small working capital loans with efficient screening, rapid disbursement 
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and a reasonable assurance of the availability of larger loans upon repayment. The beneficiaries 
are poor, but not the poorest of the poor. Benefits of the programs are modest for each client, but 
increase the income of many clients rather than create large amounts of employment. The 
organizations implementing these programs adopt a businesslike attitude towards achieving a large 
volume of lending and operate in a market area large enough to achieve economies of size. The 
evaluation also identified important qualitative factors affecting institutional performance, such as 
a clear, unambiguous mission, strong leadership, well-trained and dedicated staff, good 
management information systems and an ability to adapt to changing circumstances. 
POLICY ISSUES IN MICROENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT 
The AID evaluation, along with the other evaluations cited but not discussed in this paper, 
raise several issues about microenterprise development. They are briefly summarized here to 
contribute to the discussion about microenterprises in Chile. 
1. How does the macroeconomic environment affect microenterprise development? The 
donor evaluations frequently noted that the environment in which microenterprises function must 
be considered when designing a support project. But little concrete evidence was provided about 
how the economic environment affected the success or failure of the microenterprise support 
project, or the microenterprises it was designed to assist. It is argued that policies frequently are 
biased toward large scale firms and discriminate against small scale ones (Liedholm and Mead; 
Little, Mazumdar and Page). Few guidelines are offered, however, into specifically which 
policies may be most crucial in affecting performance, and whether or not support programs 
should be postponed if the environment is judged too unfavorable for small scale firms. 
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2. What is the potential for micro and small scale enterprises in an economy? There is 
considerable debate about the potential for small scale firms in an economy and whether or not it 
is economically efficient to assist them. On the one hand, Liedholm and Mead argue that they are 
efficient users of capital and labor. On the other hand, Snodgrasi argues that small firms in low 
income countries are reservoirs of surplus labor. Only a few have the potential for developing into 
medium and large firms, and it is difficult to identify them in advance. Policies that explicitly 
favor small firms, by providing subsidies through differential application of minimum wages, 
taxes, zoning, etc., can actually inhibit their growth into medium sized firms. Snodgrass 
recommended active government support for small scale firms only if it can be performance-based 
as was the case in Taiwan and South Korea. The challenge, of course, is to design a program that 
limits assistance to just those firms that merit it. 
3. Which type of approach to microenterprise development is most successful? The AID 
evaluation concluded that the enterprise expansion approach had generally been more successful 
than enterprise formation or transformation. This approach attempted to make only marginal 
improvements in the firms assisted. A minimalist approach was also advocated; that is, assistance 
is largely limited to credit with only small amounts of training or technical assistance. This 
approach is based on a process of self-selection among firms rather than attempting to 
predetermine which ones are likely to be most successful. The critics of this approach, however, 
argue that many microenterprises need much more assistance than is provided by minimalist 
programs. 
2 This paper is included in the DEVRES publication. 
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4. What type of credit should be made available? The minimalist approach argues that 
loans should be a) untargeted and b) used to finance working capital. Targeted credit programs 
imply that designers of the program know best what borrowers should do with their funds. This 
is a highly presumptuous implication, however, considering the great variability that exists among 
microenterprises. Untargeted credit programs, therefore, operate on the assumption that 
borrowers know best how to allocate their resources so the programs concentrate their efforts on 
simply providing a reliable source of loans. It is also argued that programs that target large, long-
term investment loans for borrowers make a mistake by encouraging microenterprises to make 
large increases in the scale and scope of their operations which they may not be capable of 
managing. For this reason, many programs emphasize short-term working capital rather than 
investment lending. 
5. How can microenterprise support programs be designed to ensure their long-term 
sustainability? Several factors contribute to sustainability. First, costs must be kept low by 
offering only a minimal set of services to participants; this factor helps justify the minimalist 
approach. Second, the scale of operations must be large. Thousands of microenterprises must be 
assisted, rather than merely hundreds as is frequently the case. Third, interest rate spreads must 
be set high enough to cover operating costs, default risks, and inflation. Advocates for 
microenterprises often argue that interest rates must be low, but surveys of entrepreneurs report 
that quick, efficient access is more important than low interest rates. Interest rates must be high 
in order to cover the costs of making small loans. Fourth, loan recovery must be high. Programs 
will not be sustainable unless they can keep their loss rate to 5 percent or less. It is impossible 
to raise interest rates high enough to compensate for a high default rate. Fifth, savings 
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mobilization needs to be emphasized, both as a way to provide financial services to 
microenterprises and to acquire financial resources that are independent of governments and 
donors. 
6. What is the appropriate role for NGOs or PVOs? NGOs and PVOs have some obvious 
comparative advantages in assisting microenterprises. Usually they closely identify with poor 
people, they are field oriented so they may better understand problems faced by entrepreneurs, and 
they are often more committed to improving this strata of society. NGOs and PVOs, however, 
frequently face several challenges. Many are not operated in a businesslike manner, they often 
lack business and entrepreneurial skills, and many are poorly staffed and organized. Although 
they often hope to eventually become financial institutions, for many the best service they can 
provide in the short term is to act as intermediaries between program participants, banking 
institutions and governmental agencies. Over time, they can develop capacity to provide more 
complicated services. 
7. Is graduation of microenterprises a feasible objective? Many specialized micro-
enterprise credit programs aspire to graduate their participants into regular banking relationships, 
but the evidence available suggests that graduation rarely occurs. In highly subsidized operations, 
there are few incentives for graduation for either the participant or the program. The prospects 
for graduation should be somewhat greater when microenterprise programs assist participants to 
obtain commercial loans from formal financial intermediaries. The information gained by the 
intermediaries about the borrowers should contribute to the development of longer term 
commercial relationships. There may be scope, however, for some microenterprise programs to 
• 
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graduate into financial institutions if existing financial institutions do not attempt to serve the 
sector.3 
8. What is the appropriate role for donors in microenterprise development? International 
donor agencies are likely to be interested in microenterprise development for the next several 
years, so foreign funds will likely be available in many developing countries for microenterprise 
support programs. Donors can play a useful role. They can help spotlight the developmental role 
of the small scale sector, they can help transfer successful experiences among countries, and they 
can fund training and technical services. The role of donors in providing financial services is less 
clear. Microenterprises generally use little of the foreign exchange that donors provide and local 
financial markets are generally adequate to provide microenterpdse loans. If donor funds are used 
to increase domestic credit supplies, care should be taken so that interest rates are not subsidized 
and that loans are not targeted to specific end uses that may be inconsistent with borrower 
objectives. 
CONCLUSIONS 
There are great differences in donor funded approaches to microenterprise development, 
but there are at least five points of concensus that appear to be emerging. First, the donors are 
increasingly concerned about project sustainability. This preoccupation arises from the criticism 
that many donor supported activities either fail during the life of the project, or cannot reach a 
3 This possibility is discussed by Boomgard, but there appear to be few cases in which this 
has actually occurred. 
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self-sustaining level of performance, so they fail once donor support is terminated. Therefore, 
several evaluations seek to identify those factors that contribute to project sustainability. 
Second, there appears to be a decline in donor concern about what borrowers use loans for 
and the impact the loans have on them. Some years ago, donors were heavily involved in targeting 
the end use of loans so that funds would be channeled into so-called productive purposes. There 
was also a concern about measuring the impact of the projects on the poor. Today, there is a 
greater appreciation of the difficulty in measuring impact because of the fungibility of loan funds. 
There appears to be greater acceptance now that a positive impact can be assumed if entrepreneurs 
value a program enough to borrow, repay, and become repeat borrowers. 
Third, the macroeconomic environment in which small scale firms operate was mentioned 
in several evaluations as a factor that should be considered when designing a microenterprise 
support project. Few guidelines are provided, however, about what specifically should be 
evaluated in project preparation besides the general issue of policy bias towards large scale 
industries. The extreme view is that projects should not even be undertaken unless the 
macroeconomic environment is first improved. 
Fourth, there appears to be consensus emerging about the characteristics of a successful 
micro and small scale support project. It should be minimalist providing few services besides 
loans, reaching thousands of beneficiaries, operating on a commercial basis with interest rates high 
enough to cover costs, and a strong effort to recover loans. Solidarity group lending is often 
advocated as a means to efficiently lend and recover loans. Emphasis is on targeting the poor as 
end users of loans, but not targeting the end uses. Loans should be directed towards enterprise 
expansion, rather than enterprise formation or transformation. Institutions to implement projects 
• 
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should be screened carefully, and many require considerable assistance themselves before they can 
efficiently operate loan programs. 
Fifth, NGOs and PVOs are frequently advocated as preferred implementing institutions, 
but there is a concern about how many are actually capable of the task. Like government 
agencies, many require considerable strengthening because their strong advocacy and commitment 
to the poor is not a sufficient attribute for operating a sustainable program. A combination of 
government and nongovemment activities may prove to be the best approach in many countries 
whereby each can work in its area of comparative advantage. 
Microenterprises can play an important role in developing economies. They can use 
underutilized resources, and they can provide employment and income to people not absorbed by 
larger size businesses. Microenterprises often represent the starting point for a firm that 
eventually becomes larger. The problems that microenterprises face should not be underestimated, 
however, as demonstrated by their high failure rates in many countries. It is not surprising, 
therefore, that commercial lenders find it difficult to serve this risky clientele, and why it is 
important to learn from the success and failure of specialized microenterprise programs. These 
experiences help identify ways that may contribute to making microenterprise projects self-
sustaining. 
• 
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Table 1 
KEY RESEARCH FINDINGS 
Enterprise Expansion 
Financial Micro- Enterprise Statistically 
Enterprise lnsti- Enterprise Trans- Significant• 
Item Formation Total tut ion Program formation 
Number of projects 6 22 6 16 14 
Average Years in Operation 3.7 4.0 7.3 2.7 2.3 yes 
Average Number of Annual Beneficiaries 328 87,871 393,172 642 264 yes 
Average Percentage of Women Beneficiaries 59 43 41 43 27 no 
Average Percentage of Beneficiaries 54 40 23 44 60 no 
in Manufacturing 
Average Program Cost per Beneficiary ($) 948 575 N.R. 575 2,549 no 
Average Loan Size ($) 508 705 676 714 3,261 yes 
Average Loan to GDP per Capita 1.3 1.2 2.2 0.9 10.2 yes 
Average Percentage of Fixed Assets Loans 25 20 9 26 45 no 
Average Program Cost per Dollar Lent ($) 3.24 0.46 0.51 0.43 1.08 yes 
Average Real Interest Rate 3 23 17 25 0 no 
Percent of Loan Funds in Arrears (%) 24 17 22 16 18 no 
•statistically significant at the 5 percent level. 
• 
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